

## Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3047  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 2306

EO 11652: GDS  
TAGS: NATO PFOR CSCE  
SUBJ: APRIL 20 NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON CSCE

REF: A. STATE 088509, B. USNATO 2274 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: AT APRIL 20 NAC MEETING, PERMREPS STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED CLOSE COORDINATION AMONG ALLIES BOTH BEFORE AND DURING BELGRADE MEETINGS. ALLIES AGREED THAT BASIC EMPHASIS AT BELGRADE MAIN MEETING SHOULD BE ON THOROUGH REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION, THOUGH A FEW SPOKE IN FAVOR OF A MORE "FORWARD" STRATEGY. COUNCIL WAS UNABLE TO RESOLVE ISSUE OF LANGUAGE IN DRAFT REPORT ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE COVERING ISSUE OF A TARGET DATE, AND POLADS WILL RETURN TO THIS MATTER AT AN APRIL 22 MEETING. PERMREPS AGREED THAT, IF THIS REMAINING PROBLEM WOULD BE WORKED OUT, NAC WOULD GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE PAPER AT ITS APRIL 27 MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. KILLICK (UK) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL COOPERATION AMONG THE NINE WITH RESPECT TO CSCE AND AFFIRMED THAT THE WORK OF THE NINE IN THIS FIELD WILL CONTINUE TO BE CARRIED OUT IN PARALLEL WITH WORK AT NATO. IN THIS REGARD, HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT A CLOSE EXAMINATION OF THE STATE OF PLAY IN BOTH FORA REVEALS NO SIGNIFICANT  
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DIFFERENCES. IN INDICATING AGREEMENT WITH THE MAIN POINTS IN THE DRAFT REPORT ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE (REF B), KILLICK EMPHASIZED THAT BELGRADE SHOULD NOT BE A CONTEST BETWEEN BLOCS. IN PARTICULAR, THE WEST SHOULD EXPLOIT TO THE FULLEST CONTACTS WITH THE NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES (FULL TEXT OF KILLICK STATEMENT BEING POUCHED TO DEPARTMENT AND LONDON).

2. CATALANO (ITALY-DEAN OF PERMREPS) ECHOED  
KILLICK'S EMPHASIS ON CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN WORK

IN NATO AND IN THE NINE ON CSCE. WHILE SHARING THE VIEW THAT IMPLEMENTATION IS THE MAIN TASK AT BELGRADE, HE SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID STERILE POLEMICS THERE. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD, WHERE THE WEST OUGHT TO BE CONSCIOUS THAT CERTAIN LIMITS SHOULD NOT BE EXCEEDED LEST THERE BE A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE SOVIET REACTION. WITH RESPECT TO NEW PROPOSALS AT BELGRADE, CATALANO SAID HIS AUTHORITIES AGREE WITH THE US ABOUT THE NEED TO FORMULATE A LIMITED NUMBER OF CONCRETE AND REALISTIC PROPOSALS. AS TO A ROLE AT BELGRADE FOR NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES, ITALY FAVORS SOME SUCH PARTICIPATION WITHIN REASONABLE LIMITS.

3. US CHARGE DREW IN DETAIL ON TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3 OF REF A IN PRESENTING US CONCEPTS ON BELGRADE AND ON HOW TO ACHIEVE ALLIED OBJECTIVES.

4. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID THAT THE PERMREPS HAD NOT HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO STUDY C-M(29) AND IN HIS VIEW THE COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE PAPER AGAIN. HE AGREED WITH THE VIEW THAT THE WEST SHOULD SHOW RESTRAINT ON NEW PROPOSALS, BUT BELIEVED THAT THE CHOICE OF WHICH PROPOSALS TO ADVANCE SHOULD BE MADE AT BELGRADE AND THAT THE ALLIES THERE SHOULD HAVE A LARGE NUMBER OF OPTIONS FROM WHICH TO CHOOSE. AS REGARDS HUMAN RIGHTS, HE RECALLED THAT THE DUTCH EXPERT AT THE CONFIDENTIAL

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MARCH 17 COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON EASTERN EUROPE HAD STRESSED THAT IT IS THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE OF THE FINAL ACT WHICH GIVES A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS. BASKET III COVERS ONLY CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THESE RIGHTS. TURNING TO CBMS, HARTOGH HOPED THAT, DESPITE THE PROBLEMS THAT CERTAIN ALLIES HAD WITH MOVEMENTS, THIS ISSUE COULD BE EXAMINED MORE CLOSELY AT AN EARLY DATE.

5. VIBE (NEW NORWEGIAN PERMREP) ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE ALLIED COORDINATION. WHILE PRAISING THE PAPER ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE, HE REGRETTEED THAT IT WAS NOT MORE "COMMITTED" ON CBMS AND HE SAW NO REASON WHY THE ALLIES AT THIS STAGE SHOULD LIMIT THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD. THE CHOICE OF WHICH PROPOSALS TO BE PUT FORWARD SHOULD BE MADE AT BELGRADE. AS REGARDS THE QUESTION OF A TARGET DATE FOR TERMINATION OF THE BELGRADE MAIN MEETING, VIBE THOUGHT AN ALLIED DECISION ON THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REACHED BEFORE JUNE 15.

6. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY A CERTAIN "TIMIDITY" IN THE PAPER'S APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID CROSSING A CERTAIN THRESHHOLD IN THEIR STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS THAT COULD COMPROMISE DETENTE, THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE SOVIETS COULD SUCCEED IN CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT SUCH A THRESHHOLD WAS VERY LOW. IF THIS WERE

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 2306

WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND AN APPROACH OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT BELGRADE THAT ADMITTED A RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLES. SCHUURMANS OPINED THAT THE FINAL ACT HAS BENEFITS FOR ALL STATES, AND THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ACT IN SUCH A WAY THAT MIGHT COMPROMISE THE RESULTS OF BELGRADE. SPEAKING AFTER SCHUURMANS, CSCE EXPERT LAURENT EXPLAINED THAT THE BELGIAN HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSAL ENVISAGED CREATION OF A POST-BELGRADE WORKING GROUP, WITH A FIXED DEADLINE AND AGENDA AND THAT ITS WORK SHOULD BE BASED ON TEXTS SUCH AS THE UN DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. THE TASK OF SUCH A WORKING GROUP MIGHT BE TO PREPARE A STUDY WHICH WOULD HELP KEEP UP MOMENTUM IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD.

7. SVART (DENMARK) EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THE BASIC APPROACH OF THE PAPER AND EXPLAINED THE VIEWS OF HIS AUTHORITIES REGARDING THE DURATION OF THE BELGRADE MEETING. IN DENMARK'S VIEW, HE EXPLAINED, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO SET AN OPTIMUM DURATION OF THREE MONTHS FOR THE MAIN MEETING, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSION SUBJECT TO CONSENSUS. THERE WAS, HE BELIEVED, A RISK OF THE MAIN MEETING BEING DRAWN OUT, WHICH WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO ALLIED INTERESTS. THREE MONTHS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME FOR CLOSE SCRUTINY OF IMPLEMENTATION.

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8. ALP (TURKISH CHARGE) SAID THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD AVOID A PROLIFERATION OF NEW PROPOSALS AND THAT THE BASIC TASK AT BELGRADE SHOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT.

9. IN A LENGTHY STATEMENT, DELWORTH (CANADIAN EXPERT) SAID THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE OVERLY COMPLACENT ABOUT ITS OWN

IMPLEMENTATION RECORD, FOR THERE WERE AREAS IN WHICH THE ALLIES WERE VULNERABLE TO EASTERN COUNTERATTACK. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES THUS MAKE THE NECESSARY PREPARATIONS TO DEAL WITH EASTERN LINES OF ATTACK, AS INDICATED BY PARA 51 OF THE PAPER.

10. IN THEIR APPROACH TO IMPLEMENTATION, DELWORTH CONTINUED, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT CONCENTRATE ON A "BACKWARD LOOKING" APPROACH BUT SHOULD AS WELL SEEK TO PRESS THE FRONTIERS OF THE FINAL ACT "FURTHER." ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HE PREFERRED AN "EVEN HANDED" APPROACH WHICH WOULD AVOID POLEMICS. IN DELWORTH'S VIEW, THE OVERALL STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THE STATE OF PLAY ON SALT, WOULD STRONGLY INFLUENCE THE ATMOSPHERE AT BELGRADE. HE EXPECTED THAT, SINCE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN PLACED ON THE DEFENSIVE IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD, THEY MIGHT WELL STEP UP THEIR CAMPAIGN IN FAVOR OF THEIR OWN DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS. DELWORTH OPPOSED ANY AGREEMENT TO A CUT-OFF DATE FOR THE BELGRADE MEETING.

11. IN BRIEF INTERVENTION, CITRON (FRG CHARGE) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES DO NOT BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE AT THIS STATE TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF NEW PROPOSALS THE ALLIES HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION. IN ADDITION, BONN SUPPORTS THE IDEA OF A TARGET DATE FOR TERMINATING THE BELGRADE MAIN MEETING, BUT THE WEST SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE EAST TO CUT OFF THE MEETING PREMATURELY. FINALLY, CITRON STRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION ISSUE AND THUS AGREED WITH THE CANADIAN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCJE OF "FORWARD-LOOKING" IMPLEMENTATION.  
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12. TINE (FRANCE) RESERVED HIS POSITION ON THE PAPER PENDING FURTHER STUDY. REGARDING A ROLE FOR NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES, HE SAID HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD FAVOR PARTICIPATION BY SUCH COUNTRIES IN TWO STAGES: (A) STATEMENTS IN PLENARY, AND (B) FURTHER STATEMENTS IN THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES. HE STRESSED THAT SUCH INTERVENTIONS BY THE MEDITERRANEAN NON-PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ONLY COVER BASKETS I AND II.

13. IN ENSUING DISCUSSION, PERMREPS AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL, AT ITS APRIL 27 MEETING, SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO C-M(77)29. THEY WERE UNABLE, HOWEVER, TO SETTLE ISSUE OF REFERENCE IN LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 76 TO A POSSIBLE TARGET DATE. L LARGE MAJORITY SUPPORTED EITHER (A) ORIGINAL COMPROMISE, I.E., "FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLIES MIGHT, IF THE SITUATION SO WARRANTS, SUPPORT A TARGET DATE, E.G. CHRISTMAS, WITH TERMINATION BY CONSENSUS," OR (B) TURKISH FORMULATION, I.E. "FOR EXAMPLE, THE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 2306

ALLIES MIGHT, IF THE SITUATION SO WARRANTS, SUPPORT A  
TARGET DATE. THE THE CLOSING DATE IS TO BE SET BY  
CONSENSUS." ONLY DANISH AND CANADIANS (IN SWITCH FROM  
EARLIER POSITION) SUPPORTED THE THIRD FORMULATION IN  
PLAY, I.E. " IN THIS CONTEXT, THE ALLIES WILL NEED TO  
DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO SUPPORT A TARGET DATE FOR  
TERMINATION OF THE MAIN MEETING." THIS ISSUE WILL BE  
DISCUSSED AT A POLADS MEETING ON APRIL 22.

14. COMMENT: IN CORRIDOR CONVERSATIONS  
FOLLOWING COUNCIL MEETING, DANISH AND CANADIAN REPS  
INDICATED TO US THAT THEY WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY TO  
SUPPORT TURKISH FORMULATION IN INTEREST OF RAPID  
RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE. OUR OTHER INFORMAL  
CONTACTS LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT MOST OTHER ALLIES WOULD BE  
PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE TURKISH FORMULATION. WE NEED  
NO FURTHER GUIDANCE AT THIS TIME. END COMMENT.PEREZ

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